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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, our understanding of the administrative state, and
particularly its relationship to political institutions created by the U.S.
Constitution, has benefited substantially from game-theoretic analysis.
Scholars who apply game theory to policy formation "view[] relationships
between political actors, such as the President, Congress, and the Supreme
Court, as a sequential game in which each party acts based on its
expectations of the other parties' responses." ' 2 Not surprisingly, the familiar
sequence created by Article I, Section 7-which sets forth the bicameralism
and presentment requirements for federal lawmaking-has attracted
particular attention.3 Scholars applying sequential models have explored
how this constitutional game has been transformed by the arrival of a new
player, the twentieth-century administrative state.4  Since federal
administrative agencies enjoy significant delegated powers5 and discretion
in statutory interpretation, 6 it is perhaps axiomatic that they may alter
federal policy in favor of the President who oversees them.7 Game theory
has added analytic precision to this intuition. It has also permitted legal
scholars to recommend specific doctrinal reforms that counteract the pro-
President bias created by the federal bureaucracy: reforms in constitutional
law, in statutory interpretation techniques, and in judicial deference to
administrative decisions (the so-called Chevron doctrine). 8
1. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 10 1-05 (1997).
2. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1406 (1996). For examples of such
scholarship, see John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (1990); and John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of
Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992).
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article , Section 7 Game, 80
GEO. L.J. 523 (1992). Article I, Section 7 reads,
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in
which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal,
and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other
House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
4. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 533-40.
5. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
7. To claim that the White House has absolute control of the administrative state would,
however, ignore nuances discussed infra note 40.
8. For a more detailed account of these recommendations, see infra Section I.C.
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This Note explores another possible compensating strategy. It applies
sequential analysis to a judicial function that has not been extensively
explored by legal theorists-the choice of remedies in administrative law.
When a court finds a legal defect in an agency's decision, two remedial
options are available: It can either vacate the defective rule or remand it
back to the agency without vacatur (that is, leave the rule in place for the
time being).9 This Note makes two arguments about this choice, one
descriptive and one normative. First, sequential analysis suggests that the
two remedies can lead to different lawmaking sequences and may therefore
generate distinct policy outcomes. Second, presumptive vacatur would best
reflect the original design of Article I, Section 7 in the age of administrative
bureaucracy. Remand without vacatur, in comparison, biases policy
outcomes in favor of the President. In short, this Note argues that, to the
extent that the sequential structure of Article I, Section 7 should inform
courts' remedial choices, vacatur should be the presumptive administrative
law remedy. Importantly, this recommendation runs counter to a recent
judicial trend: Starting in the early 1990s, courts have increasingly
remanded agency rules without vacating them.' 0 This Note offers a reason
to be wary of this development.
Much of the theoretical analysis that supports this Note's presumptive
vacatur thesis derives from a straightforward sequential model. Admittedly,
such a model makes numerous simplifying assumptions and therefore
cannot fully replicate the rich dynamics of our political life. This
predicament raises two concerns about real-world application of this Note's
recommendation: Can courts implement presumptive vacatur in the context
of specific cases? Can the sequential model, on which the rationale for
presumptive vacatur rests, accurately predict the aftermath of judicial
remedies?
This Note will make a preliminary inquiry into these questions by using
the national television station ownership rule as a case study. In 2002, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found the Federal
Communications Commission's latest iteration of this rule "arbitrary and
capricious and contrary" to the Telecommunications Act of 1996.11 Despite
these defects, the court remanded the rule to the FCC without vacating it.
12
This Note's presumptive vacatur analysis suggests that the court erred:
Vacatur, not remand, was the appropriate remedy. More importantly, the
9. In one prominent case, the majority of an appellate panel chose to remand without vacatur "so
as to afford the agency [another] opportunity to set forth its view." Checkosky v. SEC (In re
Checkosky), 23 F.3d 452, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Another judge, in a separate opinion, wrote that he
would "go one step further and vacate the [agency's] order." Id. at 490 (opinion of Randolph, J.).
10. See infra Section II.B.
11. See Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
12. Id. at 1033.
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aftermath of the court's improvident remand proved broadly consistent with
the predictions of the sequential model. Of course, no abstract model can be
conclusively verified by examining a single administrative policy. Rather,
this Note pursues its case study with the less ambitious goal of illustrating
its theoretical analysis in a tangible policy context.
Part I introduces sequential analysis of the Constitution's lawmaking
process and outlines the normative recommendations that legal scholars
have derived from this technique. Part II then applies this Article I, Section
7 game to a new field-administrative law remedies-and makes the
theoretical case for presumptive vacatur as an alternative to today's
remand-friendly jurisprudence. Finally, Part III turns to the national
television ownership rule for a real-life illustration of this Note's analysis.
I. METHODOLOGY: PLAYING THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME
As a crucial point of departure for their game-theoretic analysis,
political theorists have observed that policymaking "has an inherently
sequential structure" and that the specifics of this sequence "can have
significant implications for the kinds of policy that can be produced."'' 3 The
reasons a "particular sequential structure has arisen rather than
others .... would seem to lie in the logic of constitutional design" 4-- and
Article I, Section 7 specifies one such design. This Part articulates how this
constitutional sequence can inform legal doctrine. Section A outlines the
Founding ideology behind the bicameralism and presentment requirements.
Section B focuses on a sequential model of these requirements developed
by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn-a model that traces how the
administrative state has altered the Founders' sequential scheme in favor of
the President. Section C suggests why jurists-originalists and
nonoriginalists alike-might seek to restore the original sequential structure
without fundamentally curtailing the scope of the federal bureaucracy. It
then summarizes existing proposals for such compensating reforms. This
review of existing work will lay the foundation for this Note's main task-
developing an Article I, Section 7 perspective on administrative law
remedies.
A. The Sequential Structure of Article , Section 7
According to the Supreme Court, "the prescription for legislative
action" in Article I, Section 7 "represents the Framers' decision that the
13. Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 2, at 2.
14. Id.
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legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."' 5 This
procedure requires that, before becoming law, a bill must be adopted by a
majority of both the House of Representatives and the Senate and must then
be presented to the President for signature. Should the President veto the
bill, it can become law only upon the approval of two-thirds of each
legislative chamber.
These fundamental requirements of Article I, Section 7-bicameralism
and presentment-reflect the Framers' insight that "every institution
calculated to... keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at
any given period" is "much more likely to do good than harm."' 6 Diffusion
of political power among differently constituted entities came to be seen as
"the best defense of liberty," for "[u]nless individuals and minorities were
protected against the power of majorities no government could be
truly free.'
17
Bicameralism and presentment were to serve precisely these purposes.
Since "the legislative authority necessarily predominates" in a republic, the
Framers required departures from the status quo to gain assent from two
separate chambers, which were rendered "as little connected with each
other as the nature of their common functions and their common
dependence on the society will admit."' 8 Presidential veto, meanwhile,
responded to the fear that bicameralism would not alone stem the tide of
improvident legislation. The veto, of course, was not absolute (an absolute
veto power having "something in the appearance of it more harsh, and more
apt to irritate"19), but subject to legislative override. The Founders hoped
"that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a
proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same
time; and this, too, in defiance of the counterposing weight of the
executive." 20 Thus, the drafters of Article I, Section 7 deliberately crafted
an elaborate sequential process by which majoritarian institutions could
alter the nation's course through legislation.
Two decades ago, the Court adopted a particularly formalist reading of
Article I, Section 7. In INS v. Chadha, it rejected the constitutionality of the
15. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
16. THE FEDERALISTNO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
17. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 608-09 (2d ed. 1998).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 16, at 322 (James Madison). One can analogize the
bicameralism requirement (with the two chambers serving different constituencies) to a
supermajority requirement. This analogy is not perfect, and its dimensions are explored in JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-48 (1962), and Saul
Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
145 (1992).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 16, at 445 (Alexander Hamilton).
20. Id. at 446.
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legislative veto, a statutory provision allowing a congressional majority to
annul administrative agency decisions without presenting this annulment to the
President.21 The Court held that this procedure violated the "[e]xplicit and
unambiguous" policymaking sequence of Article I, Section 7.22 The
requirements of that sequence "are not empty formalities," the Court warned.23
In dissent, Justice White urged the Court to consider bicameralism and
presentment in the context of the modem administrative state. The
Founders, after all, had not anticipated that a vast federal bureaucracy
would become a crucial source of law. Justice White thus argued that the
legislative veto is an "important if not indispensable political invention
that... assures the accountability of independent regulatory agencies, and
preserves Congress' control over lawmaking. 24 The majority opinion,
however, rebuffed Justice White's foray into functional analysis. Whatever
the modem shortcomings of the Constitution's sequential structure, the
Court committed to stand by the precise structure of the Founders' original
plan: "With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for
abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by
making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints
spelled out in the Constitution. 25
Not long after the Court's decision, political theorists began applying
the tools of game theory to Article I, Section 7. These tools permitted a
more rigorous approach to the questions posed by Justice White's dissent:
Has the rise of the modem administrative state already altered the original
constitutional scheme and, if so, what compensating strategies can restore
the Founders' vision? The next two Sections outline the answers offered by
a game-theoretic model of Article I, Section 7.
B. Article I, Section 7 as a Sequential Game
1. Original Rules: Bicameralism and Presentment
Game theory aids our understanding of separation-of-powers regimes
26by applying a set of stylized assumptions. Although one may quibble with
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Chadha struck down vetoes by one chamber of Congress; two-
house vetoes promptly met the same fate in United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983)
(mem.). See also id. at 1218 (White, J., dissenting) (providing facts).
22. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 945.
23. Id. at 958 n.23.
24. Id. at 972-73 (White, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 959 (majority opinion).
26. The standard assumptions adopted by game-theoretic models of separation-of-powers
regimes include (1) a one-dimensional continuous policy space; (2) preference-maximizing
participants with single-peaked and symmetric utility functions; and (3) complete information, in
the sense that all players understand the rules of the game and know one another's preferences
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the real-world veracity of these assumptions, they generally succeed in
adding a degree of structure and rigor to the study of political institutions.
Eskridge and Ferejohn have contributed to this project by analyzing
bicameralism and presentment as a sequential game--dubbed the "Article I,
Section 7 game"--and drawing normative legal recommendations from
their results.27 The game is played on a one-dimensional policy space that
contains the following points:
P - preference of the President;
HM -> preference of the median legislator in the House of
Representatives;
SM - preference of the median legislator in the Senate;
Hv -) preference of the pivotal veto-override legislator in the House;
Sv -' preference of the pivotal veto-override legislator in the Senate; and
SQ "> status quo (i.e., the default policy that prevails in the absence of
legislation).
Given the choice between two options, players always prefer the option
closest to them on the policy space, regardless of whether it falls to the left
or the right of their most favored position.
Figure 1 illustrates four potential interrelationships among these
preferences, as well as the legislative outcomes that Article I, Section 7
would predict in each scenario. 28 The only preference point that changes
from one scenario to the next is the default policy SQ. However, because
(without incurring costs). For a more detailed discussion of these assumptions, see KEITH
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 21-28 (1998). To be sure, these
assumptions do not fully capture the Founders' views of human nature. An analysis that treats
individual preferences as fixed and exogenous can, for example, "have difficulty
accommodating... the idea of civic virtue." David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice
Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 103 (2000). But viewing individuals as rational
utility maximizers also should not be dismissed as an economic conceit-particularly because
this assumption was arguably shared by Madisonian constitutional theory. See, e.g., id. at 102-04,
111-12.
This Note will also assume for simplicity that legislators do not engage in sophisticated
voting. A sophisticated voter might strategically vote to replace the status quo with a policy she
considers worse than the status quo (for example, by reasoning that the new policy will prove
destructive enough to catalyze political reform, eventually generating a policy that improves upon
the status quo). One important reason to question whether such sophisticated voting frequently
occurs in Congress is that legislators need to explain their discrete votes to constituents "back
home." See Arthur Denzau et al., Farquharson and Fenno: Sophisticated Voting and Home Style,
79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1117, 1118 (1985). A legislator voting against his preferences (even in
anticipation of a sophisticated future payoff) would consider "whether or not he can explain it
satisfactorily to his supporters in order to reduce the prospects that it will become a damaging
campaign issue." Id. In other words, "principals (constituents) not only induce preferences in
agents (legislators) but also constrain their modes of behavior." Id. at 1118-19.
27. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3.
28. Since the bicameralism requirement of Article I, Section 7 treats the chambers of
Congress symmetrically, this model holds whether the House's or the Senate's preferences are
closer to the President's. Choosing the House aids this Note's narrative, because such an
alignment of preferences matches the FCC case study in Part III.
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Article I, Section 7 favors stability, this change generates
differences in ultimate policy outcomes.
















P Hv Sv HM SM
SQ X
P Hv Sv HM SM
In Case 1 A, the default policy SQ rests to the right of the median House
and Senate legislators and even further to the right of the President. 29 Each
chamber of Congress would prefer an alternative policy that reflects the
preferences of its median member. However, because Article I, Section 7
requires bicameral adoption of the same bill, the House and the Senate will
be expected to agree on a bill at some compromise point X between Hm and
SM. 30 The President, in response, cannot credibly threaten to veto bill X
because he prefers this bill's policy to the default policy SQ. Bill X would
thus meet the presentment requirement and become law.
29. Here, and throughout this Note, the phrase "to the right of' means "on the right side of,"
not "more conservative than."
30. Since the median senator's preferences are closer to the status quo than the median
representative's, the Senate would pass new legislation X only if the distance between X and Sm
remains shorter than the distance between SQ and SM.
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In Case 1 B, the median legislators in the House and Senate have
opposite directional preferences regarding any changes to the default
policy. Thus, no bill would meet the bicameralism requirement. The
presentment stage will never be reached, rendering the President's
preferences irrelevant. In short, no statute will be enacted in Case lB.
Case IC introduces the importance of the presidential veto. Both
chambers of Congress could agree on a bill that moves the default policy to
the right.3 ' However, Congress would expect the President, who prefers the
default policy to the new bill, to make a credible veto threat. A pivotal
legislator whose vote would be necessary to override the President's veto,
Hv, also prefers the default policy to the new bill.32 Therefore, no statute
can meet both bicameralism and presentment requirements, and no change
to the default policy will be enacted.
Finally, in Case ID, the default policy rests between the preferences of
the President and those of the pivotal veto-override legislators. The
arrangement of preferences in Case ID is not as fanciful as it may first
appear, for, as Eskridge and Ferejohn note, the Framers of Article I, Section
7 "anticipated many [Case ID] situations, where the President would
oppose Congress's desire to change the status quo."33 Median legislators in
both chambers would support a bill that moves policy to the right of the
status quo, but they also anticipate a possible veto threat against such a bill.
In the event of a veto, the critical veto-override voter will be Hv;
consequently, a bill that is more attractive to Hv than the status quo will
survive a veto.34 Median legislators understand how the game works, so
they propose bill X-their most preferred veto-proof option. Under the rules
of Article I, Section 7, bill X will become law. One lesson of Case 1 D
deserves emphasis: No new statute at all could be enacted if the status quo
were identical to the preferences of the pivotal veto-override legislator Hv.
This renders Hv the equilibrium position closest to the preferences of the
President. The next Subsection's discussion of the administrative state will
clarify why this equilibrium point is strategically important.
Thus, the results displayed in Figure 1 graphically represent the
carefully crafted design of Article I, Section 7. This design reflects the
Framers' balance "between republican liberty, in which popular preferences
would generate laws, and stability, in which laws would reflect deliberation
3 1. Notably, the House would not approve such a bill unless the distance between the bill and
HM is shorter than the distance between SQ and HjM.
32. Sv and Hv would both support the new bill only if (1) the distance between X and Sv is
shorter than that between SQ and Sv and (2) the distance between X and Hv is shorter than that
between SQ and Hv. In Case IC, any bill to the right of SQ would fail the latter condition.
33. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 532.
34. In other words, the distance between bill X and Hv would have to be marginally shorter
than the distance between SQ and Hv.
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among many perspectives and would not yield abrupt changes in social
policy."35 Section C suggests why courts might attempt to minimize any
systemic changes that upset this balance. In the meantime, the next
Subsection demonstrates how the rise of the twentieth-century
administrative state has arguably already caused such disruptive change.
2. New (Deal) Rules: A Pro-President Bias
The role of the federal government has expanded dramatically since the
days of the Founders, and much of the day-to-day power to interpret and
enforce statutes has been delegated to a vast federal bureaucracy. Eskridge
and Ferejohn argue that the rise of administrative agencies has effectively
altered the rules of the Article I, Section 7 game:
In the modem administrative state, Congress often will not pass a
statute setting policy precisely at [M, but will instead pass a statute
delegating the policy-setting function to an agency (A), with the
expectation that the agency will implement policy at [X], or
thereabouts. In that event, the agency can (perhaps over time) set
policy virtually anywhere it wants, unless Congress would be
stimulated to override the agency's choice by enacting new
legislation.36
This understanding of the administrative state rests on three pillars:
constitutional law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law. The
courts have not meaningfully enforced the so-called nondelegation
doctrine-the principle that the Constitution forbids Congress to delegate
unbridled authority to agencies-since the New Deal.37 Meanwhile, canons
of statutory construction are sufficiently numerous and indeterminate to
permit a range of reasonable interpretations of statutory text.38 Finally,
35. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 528.
36. Id. at 536. Agency discretion is, of course, also somewhat constrained by congressional
oversight and by judicial review. See infra notes 40, 42-44.
37. Courts have required Congress to provide an "intelligible principle" by which an agency
can measure its compliance with statutory guidelines. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). However, cases arising from the New Deal-era National
Industrial Recovery Act remain the only instances in which the Court has struck down a statute on
nondelegation grounds. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
38. For a classic expos6 purporting to show that "there are two opposing canons on almost
every point," see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401, 401-06 (1950)
(citing sources that support twenty-eight sets of conflicting canons). While much has been written
about judicial interpretation of statutes, developing an accurate picture of agencies' interpretive
practices is a "daunting" task, about which "very little" is currently known. JERRY L. MASHAW,
AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 20, 27 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory
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administrative law doctrine grants agencies significant freedom to interpret
statutory guidelines: Where congressional intent is not clear, administrators
may act upon any reasonable interpretation.39
Figure 2 illustrates the administrative state's impact on the game-
theoretic model summarized in the previous Subsection.
FIGuRE 2. ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
XA X SQ
Case 2A V V 7 '
P Hv Sv HM SM
A
SQ XA X
Case 2D v :z V
P Hv Sv HM SM
A
The preferences of the players replicate Cases 1 A and 1 D in Figure 1 (the
two scenarios where statutes were enacted), but a new player has been
introduced-the agency. The model assumes that the agency's preferences
are similar to those of the President; thus, points A and P overlap.40 In other
Research Series, Research Paper No. 33, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstractid=380483.
One recent look at interpretations by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of
Health and Human Services suggests that these practices are not consistent across agencies. Id. at
22-26.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83.
40. For an argument that the Clinton Administration made transformative changes to the
administrative state, "making the regulatory activity of the executive branch agencies more and
more an extension of the President's own policy and political agenda," see Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2248 (2001). Other institutional actors
influence the federal bureaucracy, though the precise extent of such influences is difficult to
estimate. Congress certainly plays a role. Compare Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran,
Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal
Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983) (reporting evidence of congressional influence
on agency decisionmaking), and Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) (exploring the capacity of
political actors, primarily Congress, to control bureaucratic behavior through administrative
procedure), with Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of 'Congressional
Dominance,' 12 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 475 (1987) (critiquing theoretical and empirical arguments for
congressional control of bureaucracy). Courts play a role as well. See Kagan, supra, at 2269.
Moreover, administrators themselves may possess the flexibility to act independently of
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words, one expects the agency to use delegated authority and interpretive
discretion to shift policy to the left, closer to its own, and the President's,
preferences. The agency will not, however, move policy to the left of Hv,
because doing so would invite a veto-proof congressional override. Instead,
the agency will seek to move policy to a new equilibrium XA-from X to the
preference of the pivotal veto-override legislator Hr. After all, as the
previous Subsection showed, a policy identical to Hv's preferences is the
President's most preferred equilibrium policy, one that cannot be replaced
by a veto-proof statute. The distance between X and XA thus graphically
represents the federal bureaucracy's impact on the Article I, Section 7
game. Predictably, in both Case 2A and Case 2D, the rise of the
administrative state favors the President.41
3. Adaptive Responses: Too Little or Too Much
Short of dismantling the administrative state, how can Congress restore
the constitutional balance? As the Court emphasized in Chadha,
The Constitution provides Congress with abundant means to
oversee and control its administrative creatures. Beyond the
obvious fact that Congress ultimately controls administrative
agencies in the legislation that creates them, other means of control,
such as durational limits on authorizations and formal reporting
~42
requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power.
Congress may also attempt to decouple the agencies' preferences from
those of the President, a strategy that may explain why some statutes locate
agencies outside the executive branch43 and why congressional committees
presidential control. Their ability to do so, however, is limited by the Administrative Procedure
Act, as well as by other statutory and judicial requirements; indeed, these procedural restrictions
have been blamed for the "ossification" of administrative action. Id. at 2266, 2265-67.
41. Although the pro-President bias from agency action is far greater in Case 2A than in Case
2D, the President's advantage in Case 2D is hardly insignificant. After all, as Eskridge and
Ferejohn note, the outcome X in Case 2D already reflects "a particularly striking compromise of
congressional preferences, and delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency makes [that]
compromise more acute." Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 537.
42. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 n.19 (1983). One might ask why Congress delegates
authority to agencies in the first place. Eskridge and Ferejohn point out that statutes granting the
broadest delegation to agencies were enacted during the New Deal and the Great Society, when
congressional and presidential policy preferences were aligned. Moreover, unrepealed statutes last
indefinitely, while Congress's capacity (or willingness) to foresee future preferences is limited.
Legislators may also not have appreciated fully the advantages that broad delegation gives the
President. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 539. Finally, delegation might itself reflect
congressional avoidance of "politically... divisive" choices. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v.
Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
43. One distinguishing feature of such independent agencies is that their leaders are generally
not subject to immediate removal by the President.
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exercise oversight authority over the bureaucracy." However, these
mechanisms might fall well short of fully aligning agency preferences with
those of median legislators. Congressional committees, for example, may
be packed with policy outliers,45 whose preferences may prove more
consistent with the President's than with median legislators'.
Again, game theory can prove helpful in assessing Congress's efforts to
systemically increase its power in the Article I, Section 7 game. Consider,
for example, the effect of the two-house legislative veto-a statutory
provision that allows Congress to void agency action through a bicameral
vote without presidential presentment--on the scenarios in Figure 2. In
Case 2A, both the House and the Senate will veto the agency's attempt to
move policy from X to XA. The agency may still use its discretion to alter
statutory policy X, but its ability to do so will be constrained by the median
legislator. To be precise, an agency that anticipates the legislative veto will
shift policy only so long as the median legislator closest to the President (in
Case 2A, the median House member HM) prefers the outcome to SQ.
Eskridge and Ferejohn thus conclude that, in Case 2A, "[t]he introduction
of a two-house legislative veto has the effect of moving policy outcomes
back toward those that would occur under the original understanding" of
Article I, Section 74 6 -though not all the way back.
Moreover, while the two-house legislative veto partially restores the
original constitutional balance in Case 2A, it fails to do the same in Case
2D. There, Congress will not use a legislative veto to annul agency action,
since the default policy SQ is even less attractive to the median legislators
than the agency's rule XA. Eskridge and Ferejohn describe this as a
fundamental limitation of the legislative veto: "[U]nlike override
legislation, which can not only negate the agency's rule but can implement
the rule Congress wants, the legislative veto merely negates the agency's
rule, leaving the status quo in its place. 4 7 In short, the two-house veto
would only partially, and only in certain scenarios, restore the original
design of Article I, Section 7.
If the curative effect of legislative veto is too mild, another
congressional practice-attaching override provisions as riders to unrelated
must-pass legislation-tilts the balance too far in Congress's favor.
44. For discussion of congressional control of the bureaucracy, see McCubbins et al., supra
note 40. With respect to both executive and independent agencies, it is worth adding that the
Senate may generally exercise its confirmation power to prevent the appointment of agency
leaders whose preferences strongly conflict with those of legislators.
45. See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress;
or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 145-46,
149-52 (1988). But see Keith Krehbiel, Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference
Outliers?, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 149 (1990).
46. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 543.
47. Id. at 541.
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Legislators could react to the agency's attempts to move policy to XA by
enacting an alternative policy (by majority vote of each house) and
attaching it as a rider to another bill that, for exogenous political reasons,
cannot be vetoed by the President. (Appropriations bills are common
examples of such must-pass laws.) 48 Legislative riders differ from a two-
house legislative veto in one crucial way: While the legislative veto can
only annul agency action, leaving in place the default policy, a rider can
replace agency action with a new policy. In other words, legislative riders
attached to must-pass legislation arguably evade the presentment
requirement of Article I, Section 7.49
Not surprisingly, the sequential model shows that, by effectively
depriving the President of the veto power, riders grant the legislative branch
more power than the original design of Article I, Section 7 would permit.
Riders may prove appropriate in Case 2A, where both chambers of
Congress would agree to override policy XA with policy X.50 (Indeed,
anticipating such a rider, the agency in Case 2A may think twice before
adopting X in the first place.) However, in Case 2D, a rider attached to a
veto-proof bill would allow Congress to enact a policy far to the right of
X-for example, a policy between the preferences of the two chambers'
median voters, HM and SM. Thus, the use of riders can bias the original
structure of Article I, Section 7-this time against the President.
The juxtaposition of the legislative veto with legislative riders is ironic.
The legislative veto--which does too little to restore balance to Article I,
Section 7-was found unconstitutional in Chadha. Meanwhile, legislative
riders-which do too much by biasing policy in favor of Congress-remain
legal. One cannot help but ask, is there a coherent role for courts in
patrolling the lines of Article I, Section 7?
C. What if Courts Played Too?
Thus far, this Note has used a sequential model to generate a
descriptive account of bicameralism and presentment in today's
48. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to
Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 452 (1990); Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing
Legislative Integrity at the Altar of Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 458 (1997) (criticizing the use of appropriations riders to erode
environmental protection and proposing a constitutional amendment restricting the use of such
riders); see also infra Subsection III.C.2.
49. Cf Brannon P. Denning & Brooks R. Smith, Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-
Legislation Amendment, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 972, 971-72 (arguing that the use of riders
"seems inconsistent with Article I, § 7 lawmaking requirements and with more general notions of
deliberative decisionmaking").
50. That is, assuming the distance between X and HM is greater than the distance between X
and HM.
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administrative state. This Section asks first, why this model should attract
the attention of courts and second, how the courts might react to it.
1. Motivating Judicial Participation
Jurists hardly view the task of conforming contemporary political
reality to constitutional expectations through a uniform lens-and perhaps
the most significant divide is between originalist and nonoriginalist
perspectives. 5' Originalism "accords binding authority to the text of the
Constitution or the intentions of its adopters."52 While nonoriginalists give
the same considerations presumptive weight, this presumption is
"defeasible over time in the light of changing experiences and
perceptions. 53 Such definitions hint at the occasionally blurry line between
the two modes of constitutional interpretation. In particular, as Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein observe, the term originalism is "decreasingly
helpful" when applied in "an effort to maintain fidelity to constitutional
commitments in the face of changed circumstances., 54 Confusion arises
because, "[w]hen circumstances have changed, a supposedly nonoriginalist
interpretation may well have a stronger claim of fidelity to the original
understanding." 55 The twentieth-century bureaucracy is a paradigmatic
example of altered circumstances: In the words of Justice Souter, today's
"administrative state with its reams of regulations would leave [the
Framers] rubbing their eyes.",56 Mindful of this perplexing context, this
Subsection nonetheless argues that the results of the Article I, Section 7
game ought to influence the decisions of both originalist and nonoriginalist
jurists.
51. By emphasizing these doctrinal categories, this Note treats judicial decisions primarily as
a function of legal merits. One can, alternatively, regard courts in a less doctrine-centric fashion-
for example, by emphasizing the ideologies of individual jurists. For a survey and assessment of
alternative views from two proponents of the view that Justices' votes are determined primarily by
their ideologies, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). Eskridge and Ferejohn explore the implications of the
ideological view of judging and demonstrate that this view need not undermine major normative
insights of their model. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 548-5 1; William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of
Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 165, 182-86 (1992). This Note,
however, maintains a doctrinal focus.
52. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 204 (1980). Originalism is hardly a monolithic concept, however, and there are both stricter
and more moderate varieties. Id. at 204-05.
53. Id. at 205.
54. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 3 n.3 (1994).
55. Id.
56. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Originalism, in the words of John Hart Ely, empowers the courts to
interfere with the decisions of political institutions by making inferences
"whose starting point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in
the Constitution. 57 To the extent that the model developed in Section B
persuasively articulates the original design of bicameralism and
presentment, the model's conclusions appeal directly to originalists.58 The
legislative veto debate illustrates how the game-theoretic approach to
original meanings can "better account[] for the overall goals of the
Constitution in general and of Article I, Section 7 in particular" than the
reasoning of Chadha.59 In response to the Court's assertion that the
legislative veto contradicts the Founders' original intent, Eskridge and
Ferejohn argue that
Chadha's focus on the original constitutional understanding is
unhelpful because it ignores the ways in which delegation of
lawmaking power to agencies has already destroyed the original
constitutional balance. To the extent that the Court is concerned
with protecting---or restoring-some of the original balance of
lawmaking influence suggested by Article I, Section 7, the two-
house veto is constitutionally defensible ....
The sequential model thus gives courts a richer technique for discerning
original meaning.
But can the sequential model of Article I, Section 7-which takes the
Founders' sequential design as its starting point-appeal to nonoriginalists
as well? The nonoriginalist approach is hardly unfamiliar to the Court,
which, in the words of Justice Brandeis, "has repeatedly sustained the
exercise of power by Congress, under various clauses of [the Constitution],
over objects of which the Fathers could not have dreamed., 61 But it is
likewise important to emphasize that nonoriginalism does not ignore
constitutional text or design. As John Manning recently emphasized, "[T]he
Court's articulated frame of reference... virtually always builds upon
57. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 2
(1980). Ely dubbed the originalist approach "interpretivism." Id. at 1.
58. The structure of bicameralism and presentment may prove particularly important to those
constitutional originalists who also favor textualism in statutory interpretation. One important
rationale for textualism rests on the proposition that the stringent requirements of Article I,
Section 7 render federal legislation a work of compromise. If judges engage in atextual
"purposive" statutory interpretation, they are less likely to implement the details of such
compromise. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 70-78 (2001).
59. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 556.
60. Id. at 541.
61. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
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some notion of fidelity to historical or original understanding of the adopted
text., 62 Even a nonoriginalist, therefore, "accord[s] the text and the original
history" of the Constitution "presumptive weight.,
63
The modem experience suggests two reasons to depart from the
original design of Article I, Section 7, and the second of these reasons
compels an important limitation on the implications of this Note's
sequential model. To begin with, one may question whether the original
rationale for bicarneralism and presentment--diffusion of political powers
among political institutions with distinct constituencies--survives into the
twenty-first century. Perhaps the greatest evolution has occurred in the role
of the House of Representatives-a body that, from the late-eighteenth-
century perspective, "embodied popular desires but threatened stability with
its mercurial sentiments."'64 As Eskridge and Ferejohn acknowledge,
political reality no longer supports this depiction: "[W]ith its overwhelming
reelection percentages election after election, the House is the least likely
body to reflect popular preference changes, while the Presidency is more
likely to reflect such changes. 65 It is important, however, not to overstate
the scope of such historical change. Two centuries of political history have
not eviscerated the overarching rationale for separation of powers-the
protection of minority interests in a diverse nation. 6 Although the precise
electoral dynamics of individual institutions might have changed, the
House, the Senate, and the President continue to serve different
constituencies.67 (The role of the Senate as a body where states are equally
represented may be particularly significant, since federalism perseveres as a
matter of prominent national-and judicial-concern today.) 68 By means of
its extensive procedure for federal lawmaking, Article I, Section 7 still
offers minority constituencies a voice and empowers them to negotiate
62. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1696 (2004); see also id. at 1696 n. 131 (collecting cases).
63. Brest, supra note 52, at 205.
64. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 560.
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20; cf Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain
Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410, 427 (1993)
(asserting that the Constitution seeks to establish "fair terms of cooperation among a people of
great cultural, religious, and more broadly, moral diversity").
67. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 560; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L.
REV. 275, 280-81 (1988) (emphasizing the importance of bicameralism and presentment in
controlling factional domination of the legislature).
68. Indeed, the governors of California, Florida, New York, and Texas have recently formed
a lobbying group to counteract the "disproportionate clout" of small states in Congress. See
Raymond Hernandez & Al Baker, Governors Join as 'Big Four' To Pool Clout, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 2004, at B 1. For a recent argument that the Court formalistically adheres to separation-of-
powers requirements whenever these requirements seek to safeguard federalism, see Bradford R.
Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001).
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legislative compromises. 69  Moreover, as Chadha acknowledged,
bicameralism promotes a more deliberative legislative process. 70 A
nonoriginalist would not, therefore, possess the compelling evidence
necessary to abandon the presumptive validity of bicameralism and
presentment. 7
Nevertheless, and more significantly for this Note's purposes,
nonoriginalism can help confine the steps the judiciary should take to
restore the original design of Article I, Section 7. In particular, some have
criticized the Eskridge-Ferejohn model on the ground that it counsels a
dramatic retreat from administrative rulemaking-most likely through the
revival of the nondelegation doctrine. 72 Like Eskridge and Ferejohn, this
Note declines to go to such extremes in its pursuit of the original
lawmaking sequence. A vibrant nondelegation doctrine has been
"overtaken '73 by experience, technology, history, and political reality.74
69. For a recent argument that the "unmistakable emphasis" of bicameralism and presentment
was "to give minorities, in general, and the minority consisting of small-state residents, in
particular, exceptional power to block legislation," see Manning, supra note 58, at 76, 70-76.
70. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) ("The division of the Congress into two
distinctive bodies assures that the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for
full study and debate in separate settings."). On a related note, it is at least plausible that
bicameralism limits "wasteful rent-seeking and corruption" more effectively than simple
supermajoritarianism: The requirement that "in a bicameral system a proposal must be openly
considered in two forums may work to expose misbehavior." Levmore, supra note 18, at 155.
Presentment, too, may improve the deliberative process, because the President can prove less
susceptible to special interests than legislators. See Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort
Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917, 936 (1985) ("The White House is susceptible to capture from time
to time by representatives of broad ideologies that enjoy popular support, but it is less susceptible
to capture by representatives of specific vested interests.").
71. Admittedly, the enduring vitality of the values behind bicameralism and presentment does
not validate the precise structure of Article I, Section 7. It is entirely possible that the compromise
between liberty and stability would look different if the Philadelphia Convention were held today.
But if the presumptive validity of the constitutional text means anything, it surely means that, as
long as time has not utterly transformed the nature of constitutional compromises, amendments to
such compromises must take place through the procedures of Article V and not through judicial
interpretation.
72. Daniel Rodriguez argues that a rebirth of the nondelegation doctrine "might better
illustrate Eskridge and Ferejohn's basic point" than the return of the legislative veto. Daniel B.
Rodriguez, The Administrative State and the Original Understanding: Comments on Eskridge and
Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 197, 200 (1992). He writes, "Broad delegation reflects the fulcrum
of Eskridge and Ferejohn's concern about the expanding role of the president at the expense of the
original constitutional understanding. And yet the Supreme Court has all but abandoned the
doctrine." Id.; see also Jack Knight, Positive Models and Normative Theory: A Comment on
Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 190, 193 (1992) (asking why Eskridge and Ferejohn
"did not extend the implications of the model and the related argument to its logical conclusion:
the modem regulatory state is unconstitutional"). But, asks Rodriguez, "[c]an it be that original
constitutional understanding would be served by the repeated rejection of the legislature's will and
the public interest, an interest presumably served by the various New Deal and post-New Deal
regulatory statutes that would potentially run afoul of a serious nondelegation doctrine?"
Rodriguez, supra, at 200. Given the size and ubiquity of the modem administrative apparatus,
Jack Knight suggests one response: "[W]hy waste time on a done deal?" Knight, supra, at 193.
73. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 561.
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Instead of further contemplating its resurrection, this Note pursues more
incremental efforts to square the growth of the administrative state with the
original design of Article I, Section 7. The next Subsection summarizes
some existing proposals in this vein and the criticisms these proposals have
encountered.
2. A Role for Courts: Some Proposals and Critical Responses
As public choice scholars have readily acknowledged, the Article I,
Section 7 game is played in the shadow of the law. It is hardly surprising,
then, that a variety of judicial strategies may counteract the pro-President
bias of the modem administrative state. Thus far, scholars have focused on
three strategies: constitutional law establishing the rules of the legislative
game, statutory interpretation norms guiding the implementation of
legislative outputs, and administrative law doctrine governing judicial
deference to agency statutory interpretation. This Subsection briefly
considers these recommendations and draws from the scholarly disputes
surrounding them to identify potential drawbacks of this Note's own
proposal.
First, courts can apply the lessons of the sequential model in
interpreting Article I, Section 7 itself. Thus, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue
that the Chadha Court's decision to invalidate the legislative veto arguably
extinguished an important mechanism for restoring the original balance to
federal lawmaking.75 Political theorists are far from unanimous, however, in
their support for the legislative veto. Jessica Kom, among others, cautions
against exaggerating the practical value of this procedure relative to less
formal congressional oversight tools.7 6 The significance of the legislative
veto, Korn argues, was primarily symbolic, and it "never functioned as a
significant mechanism for affecting policy outcomes. 77
74. Arguably, the nondelegation doctrine does survive as an avoidance canon in statutory
interpretation. See John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon ofAvoidance, 2000
SUP. CT. REV. 223, 242-46.
75. See supra text accompanying note 59.
76. See Jessica Korn, The Legislative Veto and the Limits of Public Choice Analysis, 109
POL. SCi. Q. 873 (1994-1995); see also Peter L. Strauss & Andrew R. Rutten, The Game of
Politics and Law: A Response to Eskridge and Ferejohn, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 205-08
(1992).
77. Kom, supra note 76, at 889. Kom's argument certainly undermines Justice White's
assertion that the significance of the veto "can hardly be overstated," INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). But this attack proves less persuasive against Eskridge and
Ferejohn, whose analysis does not appear to depend on a functional claim that the legislative veto
ranks high among congressional oversight tools. They argue instead that a game-theoretic view of
Article I, Section 7 would treat the legislative veto as constitutionally defensible. See, e.g.,
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 51, at 167 ("Contrary to Chadha, it is not clear that the
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Of course, federal courts do not merely arbitrate the structural rules of
the lawmaking contest; they also interpret this contest's product-statutory
law. The second set of compensating changes proposed by scholars affects
this interpretive function. Consistent with the Article I, Section 7 model,
Eskridge and Ferejohn have recommended that courts consider legislative
history when interpreting statutes, since such background may help "to
locate the original equilibrium point, [X)," and thus to expose the agency's
efforts to shift policy to XA. 78
In response, Daniel Rodriguez observes that an interpretation that
tracks legislative intent may conflict with other conceivable implications of
the sequential analysis, such as enforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine. 79 He notes that "an interpretation that effectively narrows the
scope of the delegation may or may not be good policy, but it is not
interpretation that is strictly faithful to legislative will. ' 80 In short, applying
the Article I, Section 7 game to statutory interpretation reveals that efforts
to counteract the pro-President bias may themselves become insensitive to
congressional directives.
Third, Eskridge and Ferejohn have used game-theoretic analysis to
critique administrative law's deferential approach to reviewing agency
action. In his work with Charles Shipan, Ferejohn has demonstrated that
judicial review "can be a 'democratic' device that induces the agency to be
more responsive to congressional preferences than it would be without such
a mechanism." 81 However, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Court held that "considerable weight should be accorded [by
courts] to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer.' '82 It thus cautioned the judiciary against
"substitut[ing] its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. '' 83 For Eskridge and
Ferejohn, Chevron's deference represents a missed opportunity to redress
legislative veto of agency rule-making violates the original understanding if that understanding is
viewed structurally.").
78. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 551.
79. See Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 201.
80. Id. There are at least two possible responses to Rodriguez's critique. First, the statutory
interpretation doctrine implements legislative directives, while the nondelegation doctrine restricts
the permissible range of such directives. One should hardly be surprised that the former is more
"faithful to legislative will" than the latter. Second, as Rodriguez acknowledges, Eskridge and
Ferejohn refuse to rely on reviving the nondelegation doctrine, perhaps because such revival is
politically unlikely. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. One can thus hardly fault
Eskridge and Ferejohn for exploring more achievable recommendations.
8i. Ferejohn & Shipan, supra note 2, at 17. As Ferejohn and Shipan acknowledge, they are
referring to the statutory preferences of the Congress at the time of judicial review, not of the
enacting Congress. Id.
82. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
83. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004]
The Yale Law Journal
the pro-President bias in constitutional policymaking. After all, "[i]f there is
sufficient evidence in the statute or the legislative history for the original
policy equilibrium in the statute, and if judges saw their role as enforcing
such statutory guidance, then judicial review becomes a powerful
mechanism for redressing at least some of the constitutional imbalance."
84
In other words, if courts could successfully use statutory interpretation
techniques to identify point X in Figure 2, they could enforce statutory
directives by overturning agency interpretations at XA.
This criticism of Chevron has not received a uniformly warm reception
from scholars, some of whom question judicial competence to second-guess
agency interpretations. Peter Strauss and Andrew Rutten, for example,
respond that agencies are generally "better readers ... of the state of
political play" than judges.85 Moreover, courts have historically proven to
86be a reactionary force against regulatory changes to the status quo.
Rodriguez likewise warns that the game-theoretic attack on Chevron rests
"on the claim that the original understanding contemplates that courts will
take all deliberate steps necessary to hinder the power of the president to
control regulatory policy." 87 Such hindrance, he warns, may itself be
"purchased at the price of other values, such as judicial restraint., 88
Whether scholarly critics have successfully repelled the
recommendations that Eskridge and Ferejohn draw from their game-
theoretic analysis remains uncertain-and this Note does not weigh in on
the issue. Instead, these debates are notable for articulating important
limiting principles for the normative implications of the Article I, Section 7
game: Proposals for compensating reforms must recognize informal
oversight mechanisms, respect congressional will, and acknowledge the
boundaries of judicial competence. It is with these constraints in mind that
the next Part extends the Article I, Section 7 game to new territory-
administrative law remedies.
II. A NEW PLAYING FIELD: REMEDIAL CHOICE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Now that the thick methodological brush has been cleared, this Part
seeks to expand the list of judicial functions implicated by the Article I,
Section 7 game. It argues that courts can advance the sequential structure of
bicameralism and presentment when they select remedies to cure
administrative law violations. A former chief judge of the D.C. Circuit has
84. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 548.
85. Strauss & Rutten, supra note 76, at 210.
86. See id. at 208-09.
87. Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 202.
88. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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succinctly summarized the two remedial options facing the courts: "When
an agency rule is remanded because of a faulty explanation, the court is
faced with the choice of whether to vacate the rule until an adequate
explanation is forthcoming or leave it in place until the new rationale comes
up again for review., 89 (To make matters a bit clearer, this Note will use the
word "remand" to describe only the latter remedy.) The legal and policy
dimensions of this choice have recently become a subject of scholarly
dispute.90 This Note does not seek to join this dispute directly, but rather to
explore how the sequential understanding of Article I, Section 7 might
inform it.
Section A analyzes remedial choice in administrative law by applying
the sequential model outlined in Part I. As it turns out, the two remedial
options-vacatur and remand without vacatur-may lead to systematically
different policy outcomes. There is a simple intuition behind this finding:
Deciding whether or not to vacate a rule can become the functional
equivalent of deciding where to place the default policy. As Subsection
I.B. 1 demonstrated, the placement of the default policy can affect
legislative outcomes; indeed, it can determine whether any statute can
muster enough support to meet the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. Applying this sequential understanding to administrative law
remedies reveals that, under certain plausible assumptions, vacatur is more
likely than remand to elicit a statutory correction to the administrative rule,
and thereby to ameliorate the pro-President bias of the Article I, Section 7
game. The structure of bicameralism and presentment therefore counsels in
favor of vacatur as the presumptive remedy in administrative law (a
presumption that can be rebutted when one of the aforementioned
assumptions fails to hold). Section A concludes by assessing this
presumptive vacatur approach in light of the criticisms encountered by
other proposals to restore the original balance to Article I, Section 7.
Following this theoretical discussion, Section B investigates how
today's courts make their remedial decisions and finds presumptive vacatur
decidedly out of sync with recent trends. Courts increasingly choose to
remand deficient rules back to agencies without vacatur, under a test
developed in Allied-Signal v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission 91-a test that does not respond to the original structure of
89. Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 236 (1996).
90. Compare Brian S. Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating Agency Action, 32 SETON HALL
L. REV. 108 (2001) (arguing that remand without vacatur is illegal under the Administrative
Procedure Act), with Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable
Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003) (defending the legitimacy of remand
without vacatur).
91. 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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Article I, Section 7. Because this Note focuses narrowly on the dynamics of
bicameralism and presentment, and thus does not fully engage with other
dimensions of remedial choice, it shall not advocate that Allied-Signal be
abandoned on public policy grounds. However, Section B makes a
preliminary effort to link the presumptive vacatur proposal to an important
statutory interpretation dispute triggered by remedial choice.
A. Presumptive Vacatur: A Winning Move in the Article I, Section 7 Game
To appreciate the game-theoretic significance of the remedial
decision, consider again the scenarios illustrated by Figure 2. Assume
once more that Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agency A,
expecting it to adopt policy X. Then, for reasons discussed in Subsection
I.B.2, the agency adopts policy XA. Assume further that a court finds the
agency's action arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the
Administrative Procedure Act. What remedial options are available? The
court may remand the rule back to the agency without vacating it, thus
leaving the policy at point X for the time being. Importantly, throughout
this period, Congress cannot alter the agency's rule by statute, because as
earlier discussion has shown, no veto-proof bill can overturn policy XA.
Thus, while the rule is awaiting agency reconsideration on remand, policy
continues to be biased in the President's favor.
Furthermore, as it reconsiders its rule on remand, the agency faces the
same incentives that caused it to select XA in the first place. The agency
may, of course, shift policy in the direction of X in order to avoid repeated
judicial reversal.92 More likely, however, the agency will invest in
additional fact-finding and legal ingenuity to end up, on reconsideration,
back where it began-policy XA. 93 Whichever road the agency takes, the
outcome is not likely to be X-the policy result anticipated by the original
structure of Article I, Section 7. It is perhaps worth noting again that, as
long as policy XA remains in place throughout the reconsideration process,
Congress will be unable to override it by statute.
The game plays out much differently if a court vacates the agency's
"arbitrary and capricious" rule. In both Case 2A and Case 2D, the policy
92. The implied assumption is that the closer administrative policy X stays to statutory
guideline X, the less likely a court will be to overturn it.
93. Courts have generally permitted an agency that has originally offered inadequate
justification for its decision to reach exactly the same decision on remand. See, e.g., Bowen v.
Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) ("It can hardly be doubted that 'an agency is free on
remand to reach the same result by applying a different rationale."' (quoting Ariz. Elec. Power
Coop. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987))); Peabody Coal Co. v. Helms, 901
F.2d 571, 574 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Perhaps on remand the agency can demonstrate that its decision
really is supported by substantial evidence.").
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reverts to the default position SQ upon vacatur. The results would replicate
those in Figure 1, and, as Subsection I.B. 1 described, Congress will proceed
to enact a new statute at X. 94 However, anticipating that the agency will
subsequently attempt to shift the policy leftward to XA (as the agency had
done prior to the court's vacatur), Congress will have every incentive to
legislate with specificity and limit delegation to the agency.95 Assuming
Congress can legislate with specificity and avoid agency delegation, the
new equilibrium will be at X, precisely where the Founders anticipated. If
some agency delegation is unavoidable, we should nonetheless expect
Congress to restrict, to the best of its ability, the agency's discretion to
move policy X to the left. This, at least, will reduce the extent to which the
administrative state can bias the original design of Article I, Section 7.
Would frequent judicial use of the vacatur remedy force Congress to
constantly rewrite administrative rules? Hardly. Not every vacated rule will
lead to legislation, nor should it. First, the alignment of preferences may be
such that Congress will readily acquiesce to the agency's rule. If no new
legislation is enacted, the agency will eventually adopt a new rule, and the
vacatur remedy will have little impact. Second, the possibility of an
override may alone prove sufficient to deter agencies ex ante from enacting
rules that do not conform with the congressional mainstream. Finally,
Congress may simply choose to prioritize its use of override legislation.
The point is that Congress would have the option to enact new legislation
overriding the rule-an option that may only be available after a vacatur
remedy when the policy returns to the default position SQ.
Thus, the game-theoretic view of the administrative state suggests that
the following remedial paradigm best reflects the design of Article I,
Section 7: Courts should treat vacatur as the presumptive remedy whenever
agency rulemaking strays from statutory design, and this presumption
should be rebutted only when one of the assumptions underlying the
94. This assumes that the distribution of congressional preferences remains unchanged since
the enactment of the original statute at X and that Congress can act before the agency replaces the
default policy with its own new rule. Given the extensive rulemaking requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act-requirements that do not, of course, apply to statutory
lawmaking-the latter assumption should not appear farfetched. And, as the case study in Part III
illustrates, salient regulatory policies can sometimes attract immediate attention from Congress.
95. Recent work on legislative overrides of judicial decisions suggests that, on balance,
congressional overrides prove significantly more precise than original statutes. See JEB BARNES,
OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS
RELATIONS 90 (2004) (reporting a fivefold increase in judicial consensus on statutory
interpretation following a legislative override). In his recent defense of remand without vacatur,
Ronald Levin suggests that the actual likelihood of congressional override is "usually remote."
Levin, supra note 90, at 343. Estimating Congress's capacity for override legislation is difficult,
but some observers suggest that overrides are gaining popularity. For example, a recent study
reports that the ratio between overrides of judicial decisions and judicial appointments has
climbed since the mid-1970s "from 1 to 6.5 to about I to 3." BARNES, supra, at 44.
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foregoing analysis does not hold. The court, for example, may have reasons
to remand without vacatur if it believes that the agency's new rule on
remand will not simply reenact policy XA-perhaps because the court's
remand order requires the agency to consider a specific issue or fact that
makes XA untenable. Alternatively, the court may find that the substantive
policy at hand is one that makes it impossible for Congress to legislate with
more specificity or to further limit agency delegation.96 In all other cases, a
defective rule must be vacated. For simplicity, this Note will call this
approach to remedies "presumptive vacatur." The case study in Part III
illustrates the presumptive vacatur proposal further-this time in the less
abstract context of a specific regulatory problem.
Before concluding this theoretical discussion of administrative law
remedies, it is worth inquiring whether presumptive vacatur is susceptible
to the same criticisms encountered by other efforts to restore balance to the
Article I, Section 7 game. The first of these criticisms suggests that
proposed compensating strategies operate at a high level of abstraction and
therefore ignore informal political tactics. A version of this critique can be
waged against the presumptive vacatur proposal: In particular, some may
consider this Note's assertion that an administrative agency can defend
policy XA on remand to be politically naive. After all, the initial judicial
finding that the agency's rule is defective will focus congressional attention
on the agency's pro-President machinations.9 7 Legislative opponents of
policy XA would then use judicial disapproval as an excuse to wield their
informal oversight tools and pull the agency's post-remand rule toward
statutory policy X.
Although this criticism is certainly plausible, this Note's sequential
model suggests that quite the opposite may happen: In Case 2D, the remand
can perversely give the agency political cover for maintaining its policy at
XA despite informal political pressure. Suppose that the agency conducts
additional fact-finding and, on reconsideration, proposes a new rule on
remand, which (consistent with the agency's initial incentives) remains
substantively identical to its original rule XA. Suppose also that Congress
responds by urging, through its oversight authority, that the agency issue a
96. In other words, the court would question the assumption of the sequential model in
Section L.A that statutory enactment is costless. Courts, of course, are not in the business of
predicting congressional reactions, but a case can be made that judges remain attuned to the
preferences of legislators. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (arguing that the intentions of the current
Congress are more likely to influence the Court's statutory interpretation decisions than are the
intentions of the enacting Congress and exploring the normative implications of this finding).
97. This congressional reliance on "fire alarms" would not necessarily signal legislative
abrogation of oversight responsibility; instead, it appears consistent with one classic approach to
oversight. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
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different rule, one closer to X To this request, the agency may offer an
important rejoinder. Any changes to the proposed rule will cause substantial
delay, the agency will argue. And time is of the essence on remand, since
the original rule XA is fast becoming "unenforceable"-that is, the courts
may soon begin to refuse enforcement of a rule they have already declared
contrary to administrative law. 98 If courts stop enforcing (that is, effectively
vacate) XA before the new remand rule is enacted, policy will default to SQ.
Importantly, as unappealing as the new rule appears to most members of
Congress, it is still superior to SQ.99 Congress may consequently prove
reluctant to use its oversight tools aggressively and will therefore acquiesce
in the agency's proposed new rule.'00 It is worth recalling that, throughout
this interaction, policy remains at XA. Congress therefore cannot enact a
specific statute requiring the agency to adopt policy X because no such
statute will be veto proof. (Its efforts to override the agency decision
through stand-alone legislation frustrated, Congress may resort to passing
an appropriations rider. As Subsection I.B.3 argued, this solution is
inconsistent with Article I, Section 7 and should be avoided.) This political
cover story is, of course, highly abstract, and it will benefit from a concrete
illustration in Part III. For now, it merely suggests that the dynamics of
informal oversight may sometimes strengthen, rather than undermine, the
presumptive vacatur proposal.
What of the charges that compliance with the original design of Article
I, Section 7 "is purchased at the price of other constitutional values, such as
judicial restraint and fidelity to Congress's will"?10' Concerns about
obeying congressional will are easier to answer: This Note advocates
presumptive vacatur precisely because it invites specific statutory guidance
from the legislature. Arguably, presumptive vacatur may advance judicial
restraint as well. At first blush, remand seems to be the remedy more
characteristic of a deferential judiciary than vacatur °2 However, vacatur
implicitly recognizes the limits of judicial competence by leaving Congress
98. See Levin, supra note 90, at 385, 384-85 (collecting cases where the courts have
accompanied remands with implementation timelines and "other techniques" to prevent "unduly
dilatory bureaucratic behavior").
99. Because the same dynamic will not occur in Case 2A (where SQ is located further to the
right), this analysis is limited to Case 2D.
100. Notably, this analysis relies on the assumption that political actors do not engage in
sophisticated voting: That is, members of Congress will not seek to replace X with the less-
favored default policy SQ in order to later override SQ with X. See supra note 26.
101. Rodriguez, supra note 72, at 202 (emphasis omitted).
102. Jerry Mashaw, however, dispels such notions in the context of the judicial avoidance
canon, the rule that courts should construe statutes to avoid constitutional problems. This canon,
he argues, "may be precisely backwards": "[E]ven if [the court] invalidates the law, it at least
returns the legislature to the status quo ante and gives the legislature a more realistic chance of
concocting a constitutional policy that is close to its most-preferred position." MASHAW, supra
note 1. at 105.
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every option: Congress may legislate with more specificity, steering the
agency closer to policy X; Congress may do nothing, allowing the agency to
enact a new rule (even if it is functionally identical to the old rule XA); or
Congress may grant the agency authority to apply its new rule
retroactively. 0 3 By contrast, as the Article I, Section 7 game reveals,
judicial remand without vacatur can take the first of these three
congressional options off the table. In that sense, the presumptive vacatur
proposal can be squared with the value of judicial restraint.10 4 The proposal
does not, therefore, appear to fall under the weight of criticisms made
against other efforts to rid Article I, Section 7 of its pro-President bias. But
the discussion has so far proceeded on a theoretical level, and the time has
come to juxtapose presumptive vacatur with the current doctrine of
administrative law remedies.
B. Leaving the Allied-Signal Test Behind
The current trend in federal courts' remedial approach bears little
resemblance to the recommendations of this Note's sequential model.
Vacatur indeed served as the presumptive remedy in administrative law
until the early 1990s, 0 5 but more recent jurisprudence, particularly in the
D.C. Circuit, has shifted toward more frequent remands without vacatur.1
0 6
103. An alternative formulation of this argument is that presumptive vacatur advances the
"fire alarm" mode of congressional oversight. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 97, at 166.
When the court sounds an alarm by finding a rule arbitrary and capricious, Congress should enjoy
all its oversight options.
104. Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit has likewise recently argued that remand without
vacatur represents an excess ofjudicial discretion, though he emphasized usurpation of executive,
rather than legislative, prerogatives. See Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 758 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen we hold that the conclusion heretofore improperly reached should remain in
effect, we are substituting our decision of an appropriate resolution for that of the agency to whom
the proposition was legislatively entrusted."). For a critique of Judge Sentelle's position, see
Levin, supra note 90, at 371-73.
105. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L.
REv. 59, 75 (1995); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to
Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REv. 805, 819-20 (1999). For further discussion of the
pre-1990s practice, see Prestes, supra note 90, at 111-14.
106. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 920 F.2d 960,
967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("As the record affords us no basis for concluding that the deficiencies of the
order will prove substantively fatal, we remand the case but do not vacate."). For other examples,
see cases collected in Levin, supra note 90, at 299-300 nn. 30-31. See also Prestes, supra note 90,
at 111 (calling remand without vacatur the new "standard operating procedure"); cf Wald, supra
note 89, at 236 (stating that, when it comes to choosing between vacating a rule or remanding it
for agency reconsideration, the "wait-and-see modus operandi"-that is, the pro-remand camp---
"appears in the lead" (emphasis omitted)). Other scholars have acknowledged this trend but
expressed doubt that it has reached the status of "standard operating procedure." See Samuel J.
Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in
Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1763, 1821-22 (2002).
Courts appear more likely to vacate when an agency rule improperly interprets a statute, see, e.g.,
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The judiciary's unfavorable treatment of vacatur has been traced to the
effects of the Supreme Court's 1988 holding in Bowen v. Georgetown
University Hospital that "a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking
authority [to an agency] will not, as a general matter, be understood to
encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is
conveyed by Congress in express terms. '0 7 After Bowen, an agency rule
enacted in Year 1 and vacated by a court in Year 2 could no longer be made
retroactive after the agency cured the defect in Year 3-at least not without
explicit congressional authorization. As a result, concluded Richard Pierce,
the perceived "increased disruptive effects [of vacatur] convinced the DC.
Circuit to adopt its new preference for the remand without vacation
remedy."' 0 8 This Section critiques this preference from the Article I,
Section 7 perspective.
The D.C. Circuit articulated its leading test for selecting a remedy in
Allied-Signal: "The decision whether to vacate depends on 'the seriousness
of the order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency
chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an interim change that
may itself be changed."' 10 9 For several reasons, this two-pronged test
proves unhelpful in preserving the original design of Article I, Section 7.
To begin with, the Allied-Signal test reflects a presumption against
vacatur. Most administrative rules, even those found to be arbitrary and
capricious, can meet the first prong of this test because there exists a
possibility that the agency will cure their defects on remand. As Pierce
observed,
I am not sure I have ever encountered a case in which a court held
that an agency failed to comply with the duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking in some respect,.., and in which the court could
reach a good faith conclusion that there is no "serious possibility
that the [agency] will be able to substantiate its decision on
remand. ' °
Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1993), than when the rule is found "arbitrary
and capricious."
107. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). For one scholar's discussion of the influence of Bowen, see
Levin, supra note 90, at 300 (citing Pierce, supra note 105, at 76-78).
108. Pierce, supra note 105, at 77.
109. Allied-Signal v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (quoting United Mine Workers, 920 F.2d at 967); see also Revesz, supra note 105, at 820
("The move toward a somewhat liberal use of remands without vacation is generally traced to
Allied-Signal v. NRC .. "). For recent decisions citing the Allied-Signal test with approval, see,
for example, Louisiana Federal Land Bank Ass 'n v. Farm Credit Administration, 336 F.3d 1075,
1085 (D.C. Cir. 2003); and Milk Train, 310 F.3d at 755-56.
110. Pierce, supra note 105, at 76 (quoting Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 151) (alteration in
original).
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In the words of another commentator, the problem is not intellectual
dishonesty on the part of appellate courts,
but rather that given the lax standard applied in these cases, a
rigorous consideration of the myriad justifications for a given rule
will often turn up explanations sufficient to create a serious
possibility that an agency will be able to substantiate its decision on
remand. This is especially true when any conceivable explanation
counts as evidence of a serious possibility."1
Nor does the second prong of the test erect a substantial barrier against
remands without vacatur: After the Bowen holding, vacating any purposive
rule can potentially cause "disruptive consequences."'1 12 In short, the Allied-
Signal test effectively reverses the presumptive vacatur approach suggested
by the structure of Article I, Section 7.
Moreover, each prong of the Allied-Signal test presents additional
concerns. The first prong-the seriousness of the agency rule's
deficiencies-generates results opposite of those suggested by the Article I,
Section 7 game. It would remand the rule to an agency precisely when, in
the judgment of the court, the agency will find it easiest to reinstate policy
XA through additional justification. From the Article I, Section 7
perspective, this is precisely the biased outcome to be avoided. Worse yet,
Congress would be unable to halt this reinstatement by enacting a more
specific statute X, because such a statute will not survive a veto. This Note
proposes to turn the first Allied-Signal prong on its head: When the
deficiency of the agency rule is such that A would likely be reinstated on
remand, the court should vacate that rule. By disturbing the equilibrium
outcome, vacatur opens the door for Congress to issue more specific
guidance. The sequential model in Part I suggests that this new statutory
guidance will reflect policy X-the policy that the original structure of
Article I, Section 7 anticipated.
The second prong of the Allied-Signal test, which urges courts to
remand defective rules whenever vacatur might cause "disruptive
consequences," fares little better. It reflects a fear that, by vacating agency
rules, courts create a temporary regulatory vacuum and open the door to
opportunistic behavior by the regulated industry-a danger that has been
made more salient by Bowen.
However, the threat of disruption looks less worrisome once Article I,
Section 7 dynamics are taken into account. While the Allied-Signal test
treats agency decisions deferentially, this Note's sequential analysis charges
111. Prestes, supra note 90, at 121 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See Pierce, supra note 105, at 76.
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courts with a different responsibility-restoring the constitutional design
for federal lawmaking. Vacatur is effective precisely because it threatens to
reinstate the potentially disruptive default position. The possibility of
disruption, in turn, shakes Congress from its equilibrium-induced slumber,
allowing it to legislate with specificity. Put differently, the disruptive effect
of the court's remedy is directly related to the probability of a specific (and
veto-proof) congressional response. In order to encourage the latter, courts
must risk the former.
Indeed, post-Bowen concerns prove less salient when courts vacate
administrative rules in anticipation of a congressional response. As the
Bowen Court acknowledged, an agency may apply its rules retroactively if
expressly authorized to do so by Congress.1 13 Since the vacating court
expects Congress to enact a (more specific) statute before the agency issues
further rules, legislators will have an opportunity to cure disruptive interim
transactions by adopting a statutory retroactivity provision114 Regulated
industries, in turn, are sophisticated political players; they anticipate that
taking advantage of a regulatory vacuum will merely invite retroactive
legislation. Thus, in light of an anticipated congressional response, the
danger of interim disruption is not a persuasive justification for avoiding
vacatur. Besides, policy solutions to disruptive events are best designed by
the legislature, not the judiciary. To put this point differently, the main risk
of vacating the rule is not an overly disruptive default policy but an
insufficiently responsive legislature. The second prong of the Allied-Signal
test is flawed because it concerns itself with preventing disruption without
inviting courts to consider the crucial question of the likely congressional
response.
So far, this Part has argued that presumptive vacatur is the remedial
approach most consistent with the original structure of Article I, Section
7-and that the Allied-Signal test is not. As a statement of constitutional
principle, this argument has independent legal significance. One may,
however, argue that its practical usefulness in a court of law is hampered by
the fact that the language of the Constitution itself is predictably silent
about administrative law remedies. 5 Is there an easier legal "hook" on
113. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
114. Moreover, an agency may shortcut the statutory notice-and-comment process when it
demonstrates that doing otherwise would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest," 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000). For contrasting perspectives on whether such a shortcut
can prevent post-vacatur disruptions, compare Prestes, supra note 90, at 127-28, with Levin,
supra note 90, at 303-04.
115. In particular, one may object that Article I, Section 7 is a precisely worded constitutional
provision, and thus judges should not use its broader purposes to inform policies that, like
administrative law remedies, are not explicitly addressed in its text. John Manning recently
articulated such a "precise constitutional text" argument as a critique of modem sovereign
immunity doctrine. See Manning, supra note 62. This Note's use of Article 1, Section 7 to inform
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which one can hang the presumptive vacatur proposal? This theoretical
Note is not the place to explore this question fully, but this Section will
conclude by exploring one argument based on section 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 116
Section 706, which governs judicial review of administrative decisions,
states that "[t]he reviewing court shall ...hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 17 One member of the D.C. Circuit has prominently argued that the
courts' failure to vacate agency rules after finding them "arbitrary and
capricious" contradicts the -plain language of section 706. In a separate
opinion in Checkosky v. SEC, Judge Randolph wrote,
Once a reviewing court determines that the agency has not
adequately explained its decision, the Administrative Procedure Act
requires the court-in the absence of any contrary statute-to
vacate the agency's action. The Administrative Procedure Act
states this in the clearest possible terms. Section 706(2)(A) provides
that a "reviewing court" faced with an arbitrary and capricious
agency decision "shall"-not may-"hold unlawful and set aside"
the agency action. Setting aside means vacating; no other meaning
is apparent. 18
Judge Randolph's analysis has not so far been adopted by a majority of
his fellow jurists 19-indeed, it stands in stark contrast to the Allied-Signal
test. Perhaps Article I, Section 7 can help. While this Note's analysis is
methodologically distinct from Judge Randolph's textualist reading of the
APA, their conclusions converge. If, as this Note argues, the vacatur
administrative law remedies can, however, elude this critique. Manning disparages efforts to
expand the scope of sovereign immunity beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment because the
text reflects its drafters' choice to go "so far and no farther." Id. at 1665. Sovereign immunity was,
of course, a matter of some salience in the late eighteenth century. The same cannot be said of
administrative law remedies, and one can hardly treat the Founders' failure to mention these
remedies in Article I, Section 7 as a conscious omission. Indeed, it is telling that, in his other
scholarship, Manning himself uses Article I, Section 7 to inform statutory interpretation doctrine.
See Manning, supra note 58, at 70-78.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
117. Id. § 706(2)(A).
118. Checkosky v. SEC (In re Checkosky), 23 F.3d 452, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (opinion of
Randolph, J.) (citation and footnote omitted); see also Prestes, supra note 90, at 129-50 (analyzing
the text and legislative history of the APA to show that the remedy of remanding without vacatur
is unlawful). For a critique of Judge Randolph's position, see Levin, supra note 90, at 309-15.
119. However, it has recently been echoed by Judge Sentelle. See Milk Train, Inc. v.
Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Moreover, Levin, a
persuasive advocate of remand without vacatur, has recently highlighted deliberations among
Supreme Court Justices, at least some of whom appear "likely to entertain some doubts about"
that remedial practice. Levin, supra note 90, at 352-53, 351-54.
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remedy best supports the original structure of Article I, Section 7, then
Judge Randolph's position should receive the benefit of an additional
thumb on the scales in statutory construction of the APA. After all, the
Court has held that statutes should not be interpreted in derogation of
certain constitutional norms unless Congress has required such derogation
with unambiguous language.1 20 Judge Randolph's interpretation of the APA
may prevail when aided by a similar clear-statement rule favoring the
original design of Article 1, Section 7.
In summary, the structure of Article I, Section 7 can inform courts'
remedial choices in administrative law. Its dynamics favor a presumption in
favor of vacating defective agency rules. This presumption is not simply a
punitive measure designed to improve agency compliance with
administrative law, though this is certainly one virtue of vacatur.1 21 Instead,
this Note uses a simple sequential model to show that vacatur also advances
the original structure of constitutional lawmaking by giving Congress
incentives to replace defective agency rules with specific legislation. The
presumption in favor of vacating arbitrary and capricious rules should only
be lifted in limited circumstances, and the reigning Allied-Signal test fails to
identify these circumstances properly.
But theory is not enough: This Note's proposal for selecting
administrative law remedies should prove workable outside the hypothetical
world of formal models (and the entourage of simplifying assumptions that
accompanies such models). In an effort to assess the practicability of the
proposal, Part III poses two questions: Is the presumptive vacatur proposal
operational enough to guide a court in any given case? Can the game-
theoretic model on which the proposal rests accurately predict the
consequences of judicial remedies? In an inquiry that is more preliminary
and illustrative than conclusive., Part III pursues these questions through a
case study of national television station ownership regulation.
1II. MEDIA-OWNERSHIP RULES: A CASE STUDY OF REMEDIAL ERROR
In June 2003, the Federal Communications Commission announced a
sweeping relaxation of the nation's media-ownership rules. "[L]ike a distant
echo from the past," the existing rules did not address the reality of modem
120. Perhaps the best known of these clear-statement rules relates to federalism principles.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452. 460 (1991).
121. Pierce, who supports the Allied-Signal test, acknowledges that "agencies will take the
duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking less seriously in the absence of a significant risk of
vacation" and that "the cost of the [Allied-Signal] doctrine will take the form of loss of some
portion of the benefits of compelling agencies to comply with that duty." Pierce, supra note 105,
at 78.
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communications markets and technologies, the agency argued.122 It took
particular aim at a rule limiting television networks' ability to own affiliates
nationwide-the so-called national television station ownership (NTSO)
rule-and lifted this cap from the statutory ceiling of thirty-five percent
123
to forty-five percent. 
124
The FCC's conclusion hardly reflected a national consensus; in fact, an
unorthodox coalition had campaigned vocally against relaxing ownership
rules. Several liberal groups ran a dramatic advertisement in the New York
Times: four television screens, each representing a major network, all
broadcasting the face of Rupert Murdoch. The ad declared, "This Man
Wants to Control the News in America. The FCC Wants to Help Him."
1 25
Meanwhile, members of the National Rifle Association, concerned about
domination by "gun-hating media giants,"1 26 barraged the FCC with
300,000 postcards. 127 As the five commissioners prepared to vote on the
media-ownership rules, the Washington Post reported that the agency's
"voice- and e-mail systems were temporarily shut down by a deluge of
public comments."'
' 28
The mayhem that preceded the FCC's decision merely foreshadowed
the chaos that followed. Members of both chambers of Congress attempted
to repeal the rule, using new legislation, a form of the legislative veto, and
the appropriations process. In the meantime, the Bush Administration
threatened to veto any congressional interference with the Commission's
decision. Eventually, an eleventh-hour compromise on the NTSO rule
brought the interbranch stalemate to an end. Figure 3 highlights key events
between the FCC's decision and this compromise.
122. In the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, 13,623 (June 2,
2003) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review].
123. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
124. The newly issued NTSO rule read, in relevant part, "No license for a commercial
television broadcast station shall be granted ... if the grant... would result in such
party ... having a cognizable interest in television stations which have an aggregate national
audience reach exceeding forty-five (45) percent." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(1) (2003) (emphasis
added).
125. For an image of the advertisement, see http://www.dvmx.com/Murdoch-nyt.pdf (last
visited Oct. 17, 2004).
126. Editorial, Who Can Own Media?, WASH. POST, May 31, 2003, at A18 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
127. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Plan To Alter Media Rules Spurs Growing Debate, WASH.
POST, May 28, 2003, at Al.
128. Frank Ahrens, FCC Set To Vote on Easing Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June
2, 2003, at A6.
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FIGURE 3. NTSO CASE STUDY CHRONOLOGY
June 2, 2003: FCC adopts new media ownership rules,
including relaxation of NTSO ceiling to 45%
June 4, 2003: Senate resolution to rescind FCC's new rules
introduced
June 12, 2003: House bill to invalidate FCC's new rules
introduced
June 19, 2003: Senate Commerce Committee favorably reports
bill that would restore NTSO ceiling to 35%
July 15, 2003: Senate "resolution of disapproval" of FCC's
new rules submitted
July 16, 2003: House Appropriations Committee amends
appropriations bill to reinstate 35% ceiling
July 22, 2003: OMB statement indicates that Bush
Administration will veto appropriations bill that reverses
FCC's new rules
July 23, 2003: House approves appropriations bill reinstating
35% ceiling
September 16, 2003: Senate adopts "resolution of disapproval"
toward FCC's new rules
November 2003: Compromise 39% ceiling included in
appropriations legislation
This Part discusses the political fallout from the FCC's decision as it
relates to administrative law remedies. The agency promulgated its June
2003 rule on remand from the D.C. Circuit. That court had found the FCC's
earlier action on the NTSO rule arbitrary and capricious in Fox Television
Stations v. FCC, but declined to vacate it.129 Applying the sequential model
of Article I, Section 7, this Part argues that the court chose its remedy
improvidently.
Section A provides basic background on media-ownership rules,
focusing on the NTSO rule's history prior to the Fox decision. Section B
critically examines the choice of remedies in Fox. It applies the test
developed earlier in this Note and finds that the court erred by remanding
the rule to the FCC without vacating it. Finally, Section C explores the
aftermath of Fox. It finds subsequent events broadly consistent with the
predictions of the sequential model.
129. 280 F.3d 1027, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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A. Before Fox: A Brief Regulatory History
Regulation of national television ownership began at the dawn of the
industry itself. In 1940, the Commission decided that no more than three
stations nationwide could be owned by the same entity. 130 Although the
number of television stations expanded dramatically following World War
11,131 the FCC continued to favor "an absolute numerical limit of stations
under common ownership, without regard to population served, size of
station, or changes in the media market."' 32 By the early 1950s, this limit
rose to seven stations, 33 where it remained for thirty years.
By 1984, broader deregulatory trends compelled the FCC to revisit its
media regulation regime. The seven-station rule, argued the Commission,
had been made anachronistic by the "explosive growth and change" in the
mass media market and by the broad availability of cable television.134
More generally, it found that "group owners do not impose a monolithic
editorial viewpoint on their stations, but instead permit and encourage
independent expression by the stations in response to local community
concerns and conditions."'' 35 On the basis of this evidence, the Commission
decided to phase out the NTSO rule.136
But the Commission was unable to persuade Congress, which used an
appropriations bill to block implementation of the FCC's report. 37 On
reconsideration, the Commission increased the numerical cap on television
station ownership from seven to twelve, but decided the cap would no
longer be phased out. 138 Moreover, in addition to the numerical cap, the
FCC imposed a limit on "the aggregate ownership interests in TV stations
to those which penetrate a maximum of 25 percent of the national
audience."' 139 These rules remained in place for over a decade, until the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ushered in a new era of communications
130. See 1941 FCC ANN. REP. 34.
131. See Herbert H. Howard, Multiple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED.
COMM. B.J. 1, 9 (1974).
132. Report and Order, In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections
73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM,
FM aid Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, 22 (1984).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 20.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-396, tit. flI, § 304, 98 Stat.
1369, 1423 (1984).
138. Memorandum Opinion and Order, In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555,
[formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 100 F.C.C.2d 74, 97 (1984).
139. Id.
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regulation-or, as the political forces rallying behind the Act contended, of
communications deregulation.
140
Consistent with its overall deregulatory mission, the Act made two
changes to the NTSO rule. It directed the FCC to eliminate restrictions on
the number of television stations an entity may own nationwide."14 The Act
also relaxed, without eliminating, the national audience-reach limitation
from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent. 142 Finally, Congress
directed the FCC to "review its... ownership rules biennially ... and
determine whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest as
the result of competition.
1 43
The FCC's first biennial review took four years to complete, and
comments submitted to the agency aligned predictably. On the one hand,
major broadcast networks urged it to eliminate the NTSO rule, predicting
that consolidation would lead to economies of scale and greater
programming diversity. 44  By contrast, local affiliates asked the
Commission to maintain the thirty-five percent rule. Further industry
concentration, they argued, would enhance the bargaining power of
networks in negotiations over local programming. 145 Also supporting the
NTSO rule were artists' unions.1
46
Finally, in March 2000, the then-Democrat-controlled agency decided
not to alter the thirty-five percent national audience-reach cap established
by the Act. 147 It cited a number of reasons with a shared theme: caution.
First, "prudence dictates that we should monitor the impact of our recent
decisions" relaxing restrictions on television duopolies and television-radio
combinations, argued the Commission. 148 Second, the agency observed a
flurry of media consolidation since 1996, and thought it best to proceed
cautiously.1 49 The decision to maintain the cap was not uncontroversial,
with the two Republican commissioners, Harold Furchtgott-Roth and
Michael Powell, dissenting.1
50
140. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). The purpose clause of the Act begins with the phrase, "[t]o
promote competition and reduce regulation." Id. at 56.
141. Id. § 202(c)(1)(A), 110 Stat. at I11.
142. Id. § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat. at 111.
143. Id. § 202(h), 110 Stat. at 111-12.
144. See Biennial Review Report, In the Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-
Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11,058, 11,070-71 (2000).
145. See id. at 11,071-72 (discussing comments by the National Association of Broadcasters).
146. See id. (discussing comments by the American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists).
147. Id. at 11,072.
148. Id. at 11,073.
149. Id. at 11,074.
150. Id. at 11,131 (dissenting statement of Comm'r Furchtgott-Roth); id. at 11,140 (separate
statement of Comm'r Powell).
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But the FCC's biennial review, already two years behind schedule, was
not quite over yet. Several networks challenged the decision to maintain the
NTSO rule in court, where the battle continued until February 2002-that
is, for about two additional years. Then, in Fox, the D.C. Circuit held that
the Commission's decision to retain the NTSO rule was "arbitrary and
capricious and contrary" to the Telecommunications Act.151 The court then
remanded the rule to the FCC, which led to its reconsideration in June
2003. The next Section applies the decision rules developed in Part II to the
D.C. Circuit's choice of remedy.
B. A Critical Look at Fox Remedies
This Note's sequential analysis suggested that courts should treat
vacatur as the presumptive remedy when agency rules prove "arbitrary and
capricious."'5 2 This presumption may be rebutted (1) when the agency is
likely to improve the defects of its rule on remand (for example, because it
had insufficient opportunity to develop the rule in the first place or because
the court will require the agency to consider a theretofore-ignored decisive
factor), or (2) when Congress is unlikely to legislate with specificity on the
subject matter of the agency's rule. Applying this methodology to the Fox
decision reveals that the court improperly failed to vacate the NTSO rule
before remanding it to the FCC.
Consistent with the recent trend, the Fox court did not adopt the
presumption recommended by this Note's analysis. Instead of treating
vacatur as the default remedy, it asserted that the remedial "question is one
of degree." 153 The court also applied the Allied-Signal test, which favors
remanding agency rules without vacatur.1
54
Of course, an incorrect presumption will not necessarily lead to an
incorrect decision. A court should decline to vacate a rule if it suspects that
the agency will adopt a more appropriate rule on remand, if only that
agency has a chance to consider all the facts again. The Fox court, however,
had no reason to expect a different outcome on remand. The FCC did not
appear to have overlooked critical factors by acting too quickly; by contrast,
the agency took four years to render its decision, two years longer than the
Telecommunications Act anticipated. Indeed, both Republican
151. Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
152. Of course, this presumption is inoperable if federal courts are prohibited by statute from
vacating the agency's action. However, the D.C. Circuit explicitly ruled in Fox that no such
prohibition existed. Id. at 1048. The judges therefore faced a genuine choice between vacating the
agency's action and remanding it without vacatur.
153. Id. ("[V]acatur is not necessarily indicated even if an agency acts arbitrarily and
capriciously in promulgating a rule.").
154. See supra Section ll.B.
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commissioners had mentioned in their dissents that the Commission had
accumulated ample data.
1 55
Furthermore, the Fox court did not affirmatively require the FCC to
consider any facts that the agency could have reasonably missed in its
initial review. Indeed, it declared the NTSO rule arbitrary and capricious
based largely on the Commission's inattention to its own 1984 report' 56 -
hardly the stuff of accidental omissions. Nor did the court anticipate that the
report would necessarily compel the FCC to reach a different outcome. All
the court required the agency to do was to "state the reason(s) for which it
believes its contrary views set out in the 1984 Report were incorrect or are
inapplicable in the light of changed circumstances."1 57 Such a conclusion,
according to the Fox court, "is by no means inconceivable; the Report is,
after all, now almost 20 years old."'' 58 In short, the court gave no indication
that the agency should avoid reaching the same outcome again.
This Note suggests one other reason why a court might avoid vacating
an agency rule-concern that Congress will prove unable to legislate with
specificity on the matter at hand, leaving in place the disruptive default
policy. The Fox court, however, did not appear to possess persuasive
evidence on this account. Enacting a new NTSO rule effectively requires
legislators to identify a single data point-the national audience cap,
expressed in percentage terms. Six years earlier, Congress had
demonstrated its capacity to enact such legislation when it raised the cap
from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent in the Telecommunications
Act-and did so in about thirty words.1 59 In practice, Congress may still
have failed to answer the D.C. Circuit's vacatur with specific legislation,
but the judges had few reasons to suspect that Congress was incapable of
such action. Therefore, if the FCC's decision to maintain the NTSO rule
was indeed "arbitrary and capricious," the court should have vacated it.
C. After Fox: Testing Predictions
This Note's sequential model has yielded several predictions about the
consequences of judicial remedies in administrative law. In order to
illustrate these predictions, this Section examines the aftermath of the Fox
155. See Biennial Review Report, supra note 144, at 11,135 (dissenting statement of Comm'r
Furchtgott-Roth); id. at 11,154 (separate statement of Comm'r Powell).
156. See Fox, 280 F.3d at 1045.
157. Id. at 1048 (emphasis omitted).
158. Id. (emphasis omitted).
159. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(c)(1)(B), 110 Stat.
56, 111 ("The Commission shall modify its rules for multiple ownership set forth in section
73.3555 of its regulations (47 C.F.R. 73.3555) by increasing the national audience reach limitation
for television stations to 35 percent.").
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court's failure to vacate. Figure 2 from Part I approximates the relative
preferences of the President, the House, and the Senate after the D.C.
Circuit's ruling (preferences on the left side of the spectrum representing
looser restrictions on media ownership). In other words, the Bush
Administration and FCC Chairman Michael Powell favored the least
stringent NTSO rule, the Senate favored greater restrictions, and the House
held an intermediate position.1 60 The default policy in the absence of any
legislation-a policy of no specific caps on media mergers-was on the left
side of the policy spectrum. Thus, the dynamics following the Fox decision
resembled Case 2D.
Section II.A made three theoretical predictions about the consequences
of a failure to vacate in Case 2D. First, on remand, the agency would adopt
the policy closest to the President's preferences, constrained only by the
threat of a veto-proof congressional override. This outcome, as Subsection
I.B.2 showed, biases the formal Article I, Section 7 process in favor of the
President. Second, if congressional efforts to override the agency's action
encounter a credible veto threat, legislators might evade the constitutional
presentment requirement by attaching override provisions to must-pass
appropriations bills. This strategy, too, undermines the process outlined by
Article I, Section 7, this time in Congress's favor. Third, legislators would
use their informal oversight tools to control administrative action. The
court's remand remedy would, however, offer the agency a rhetorical
defense: The agency could urge Congress to acquiesce to its proposal
quickly, warning that the courts might react to agency delay by restoring
the default policy. Subsections 1, 2, and 3, respectively, argue that the
aftermath of Fox appears consistent with each of these three predictions.
At the outset, it is important to note that no single case study can
endeavor to confirm the predictions of a theoretical model. The aftermath of
the NTSO rule is no exception, for this case study has several possible
drawbacks. Perhaps the unique political salience of media-ownership rules
distinguishes them from the typical agency decision. Additionally, since the
FCC issued its new NTSO rule along with five other changes to media-
ownership regulation, the subsequent congressional actions may have
reflected some tradeoffs within this package of policies.1 61 The particular
preferences of congressional committee chairs likewise complicate any
efforts to model congressional action. Finally, it is worth recalling that the
160. For example, the President had to threaten a veto when Congress tried to restore the
preexisting stringent caps. See in&ra text accompanying notes 171-175. For a comparison of the
House and Senate, see infra text accompanying notes 167-170.
161. While the controversy over the NTSO rule was resolved in legislative compromise, the
FCC's other reforms to media-ownership regulation encountered further difficulties in the courts.
See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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D.C. Circuit remanded an action of a Democrat-controlled FCC, while the
2003 changes were adopted by the Commission's Republican majority.
Thus, this Section falls short of offering definitive proof and is best viewed
as an illustration of this Note's theoretical model.
1. Prediction 1: Agency Action on Remand
Section II.A predicted that, on remand, an agency would adopt policies
most favorable to the President, provided that Congress would prove unable
to override them with veto-proof legislation. Thus, in Case 2D, the agency
would adopt policy XA, which mirrors the preference of the pivotal veto-
override legislator. It is, alas, impossible to determine definitively whether
the FCC indeed chose this precise point after the Fox remand-after all, we
do not know exactly which member of Congress would have been the
pivotal legislator, much less what her preferences were. Nonetheless,
considerable evidence exists that, as Section II.A predicted, the FCC's
forty-five percent rule was a policy that would have narrowly escaped a
veto-proof legislative override in both chambers of Congress.
Shortly after the FCC announced changes to media-ownership rules on
June 2, 2003, both chambers of Congress launched overhaul measures.
Immediate outcry in the Senate came not only from Democrats, but also
from former Majority Leader Trent Lott and Appropriations Committee
Chairman Ted Stevens. 162 In early June, a "sense of the Senate" resolution
sponsored by sixteen senators sought to rescind all the new media-
ownership rules. 163 The Senate Commerce Committee also issued an
unprecedented rebuke to Powell 164 by endorsing a bill that would reinstate
the thirty-five percent cap. 165 In July, a coalition of nine senators also
launched a resolution "disapproving the rule"16 6-a form of legislative veto
codified as part of the mid-1990s "Contract with America" agenda. 167 (If
successful, this would have marked the second time this form of legislative
veto was ever invoked-and the first time by a Republican Congress
162. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Democrats Seize on FCC Rule, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2003, at A4.
163. S. Res. 159, 108th Cong. (2003).
164. See Sean Marciniak & Yochi J. Dreazen, Senate Panel Votes To Override FCC on
Recent Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2003, at A4.
165. Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and Competition in Television Broadcast
Service Act of 2003, S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003).
166. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003).
167. Unlike the two-house legislative veto discussed in Subsection I.B.3, this form of
legislative veto required presentment to the President. See Contract with America Advancement
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 251, 110 Stat. 847, 868-74 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808
(2000)).
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against a Republican Administration.) 168 Opposition to the FCC's new rules
faced somewhat greater obstacles in the House, where Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin supported the FCC's
approach.169 Not surprisingly, a House bill seeking to invalidate the FCC's
new rules languished in committee, despite attracting ninety-eight sponsors
by the end of July. 
170
Apparently, these legislative efforts to roll back the FCC's
rulemaking-as well as parallel developments in the appropriations
process, described in the next Subsection-raised alarms at the White
House. Before Congress departed for its August recess, the Administration
issued a written veto threat. 17 1 (If levied, this would have marked the first
time the Bush Administration used its veto power against the Republican
Congress.) 172 Yet congressional action did not grind to a halt. Upon
returning in September, the Senate formally adopted its "resolution of
disapproval.' 73 By November, 205 members of the House had signed a
letter to Speaker Dennis Hastert requesting a floor vote on the resolution.
17 4
Some legislators openly suggested that the President's threatened veto
could be overridden.
175
Ultimately, the Bush White House was never forced to levy the veto.
By fall, the thrust of legislative efforts to override the FCC's rulemaking
shifted to the appropriations process. On balance, however, the trajectory of
legislative response supports the predictions of the game-theoretic model:
Opposition to the FCC's forty-five percent rule in the Senate (which passed
a resolution to override this rule) and the House was substantial enough to
invite a veto threat. The very fact that Congress chose to switch to the
appropriations strategy suggests that this veto was unlikely to be
overridden. Thus, the FCC's forty-five percent rule appears to have
168. The first occurred in 2001, when Republican majorities in Congress used the veto to
annul rules adopted by the Clinton Administration's OSHA. See Ron Orol, House Dems Rally
Against FCC Media Regulations, DAILY DEAL, June 6, 2003, at 1.
169. See, e.g., Marciniak & Dreazen, supra note 164.
170. Protect Diversity in Media Act, H.R. 2462, 108th Cong. (2003). For the list of sponsors,
see Bill Summary and Status, http://thomas. loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/z?d I 08:HR02462:@@@P
(last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
171. See OMB, Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2799 (July 22, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/1 08-1/hr2799sap-h.pdf.
172. For a record of presidential vetoes, see Office of the Clerk, Presidential Vetoes,
http://clerk.house.gov/histHigh/Congressional-History/vetoes.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
173. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003). For a breakdown of the vote, see U.S. Senate, Roll
Call Vote, http://www.senate.gov/egislative/LIS/roll calllists/roll-call vote cfm.cfin?congress
1 08&session= I &vote=00348#top (last visited Oct. 17, 2004).
174. See Press Release, Representative Maurice Hinchey, Bipartisan Coalition of House
Members Demand Vote on FCC Media Regulations (Nov. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny22_hinchey/fcc-mediaregulations I 10503.html.
175. See Ron Orol, Lawmakers Weigh Veto of Media Regs Against Bush Threat, DAILY
DEAL, Sept. 12, 2003, at 1.
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displayed the essential characteristics of policy XA-it was substantially
more favorable to the President than to Congress, but it was not so pro-
President as to invite veto-proof legislation.
2. Prediction 2: Congressional Use of Appropriations Process
Earlier discussion also suggested that Congress may respond to agency
rulemaking by attaching an override provision to a must-pass
appropriations bill, thereby evading the presentment requirement. From the
perspective of Article I, Section 7, this is an overreaction, for it shifts policy
further from the President's preferences than the Founders' deliberate
design permits.176 The aftermath of the Fox remand reveals that the danger
of such overreaction is not merely theoretical: As regular legislative efforts
to annul the FCC's rules encountered a veto threat, Congress aggressively
pursued an appropriations rider.
Talk of using the appropriations process to annul the FCC's action
began in the Senate as early as June. 17 7 The crucial breakthrough, however,
came from the House Appropriations Committee-a surprise, given its
chairman's support for the FCC. 178 In mid-July, eleven Republican
members of that panel joined their Democratic colleagues in attaching to
the Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill a rider that would have
reinstated the thirty-five percent cap. 179 The President then threatened to
veto any measure that reversed the FCC's media-ownership rule, but the
House nonetheless approved the appropriations bill with its rider1 80 by a
vote of 400 to 21.181 Senate approval was expected to follow.1 82
The appropriations process picked up steam again in the fall, just as the
other legislative efforts to reverse the FCC's rules bogged down. Although
some FCC allies had hoped that the thirty-five percent rider would
eventually die in conference committee, the House-Senate negotiators
vowed as late as November 19 to maintain it.183 Once congressional
overhaul of the forty-five percent rule appeared inevitable, the White House
176. See supra Subsection I.B.3.
177. See Jaret Seiberg, Lott, Hollings Threaten FCC, DAILY DEAL, June 3, 2003, at 1.
178. See Ron Orol, House Panel Backs Repeal of New TV Ownership Cap, DAILY DEAL,
July 17, 2003, at 1.
179. See David Rogers, House Panel Opposes Easing Media-Limit Rule, WALL ST. J., July
17, 2003, at A4.
180. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2004, H.R. 2799, 108th Cong. (2003).
181. See Yochi J. Dreazen & Joe Flint, In Blow to FCC, House Votes To Reverse Media
Deregulation, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2003, at Al.
182. See Christopher Stem & Jonathan Krim, House Votes To Prevent Change in Media
Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at Al.
183. See David Rogers, Spending Bill Would Restore Tighter Media-Ownership Cap, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 20, 2003, at B2.
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backed down and cut a last-minute deal with the Senate's powerful
Appropriations Chairman Stevens.' 84 The compromise solution was a
thirty-nine percent NTSO rule-just enough to protect News Corp.,
Murdoch's media conglomerate, from having to divest its properties.1
85
(Although other FCC critics cried out against the compromise, Stevens's
support would have been essential to accomplishing any appropriations-
based overhaul.)' 86 Notwithstanding Stevens's eleventh-hour defection, the
appropriations strategy allowed Congress to win concessions despite the
White House veto threat-as the sequential model generally predicted.
3. Prediction 3: Agency Responses to Informal Congressional
Pressure
Needless to say, not all the instruments in the congressional toolkit
have the bluntness of appropriations riders. Legislators can use their
authority to persuade an agency that its decision is wrong on the merits.
Section II.A predicted that a judicial remand would allow administrators to
respond to this informal pressure by pointing the finger at courts. As this
Subsection briefly argues, that is precisely the rhetorical strategy the FCC
followed.
Even before its June announcement, the FCC attempted to prevent
legislators from previewing the new rules-and it blamed the courts for an
expedited timeline. When several moderate senators asked the FCC to delay
its rulemaking on media ownership, 87 Powell balked, noting that "judicial
sustainability is a key objective of this proceeding."'' 88 More importantly,
Powell argued that courts left him no choice but to update the media-
ownership rules without any delay. "When the judiciary reverses our
rules,. . it is incumbent on us to repair the shortcomings as quickly as
possible," he wrote to the FCC's two Democratic commissioners, who had
requested more time to deliberate about the new rules. 189 At times, Powell's
language swung from urgency to alarm: "[T]he public interest is presently
184. See Ron Orol, FCC Opponents Protest White House Interference, DAILY DEAL, Nov.
26, 2003, at 1.
185. See id. For codification of the compromise, see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. B, tit. VI, § 629, 118 Stat. 3, 99 (2004).
186. See Orol, supra note 184.
187. See Letter from Senators Wayne Allard, Olympia Snowe, and Susan Collins to Michael
Powell, Chairman, FCC (Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/
chairmans response/Snowe _March 19.pdf.
188. Chairman Michael K. Powell Responds to Members Regarding Upcoming Biennial
Review of Media Ownership, http://vww.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/chairmansresponse/
rnkp.response.htxx (last visited Oct. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Powell Response].
189. See Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Responds to Request for Delay on Media
Ownership Proceeding (May 15, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/
attachmatch/DOC-234583A 1 .pdf
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being ill-served by a body of rules that have been severely wounded and
rendered substantially ineffective by withering judicial fire. Survival
demands action."'190 Thus, the appearance of judicially imposed time
pressure on remand was used to keep legislative and administrative critics
at bay.
Once the new media rules were released, the FCC blamed the courts for
the substance of the decision as well. When legislators criticized him for
relaxing NTSO caps, Powell replied that he had done precisely the
opposite: "reinstate[d] legally enforceable" caps.191 "Keeping the rules
exactly as they are... was not a viable option. Without today's surgery, the
rules would assuredly meet a swift death" in courts, he argued. 192 Some
commentators noted with irony that Powell-a known ideological crusader
for media deregulation-had suddenly adopted a "courts-made-me-do-it"
stance toward his own deregulatory decisions. 193 But even as the
appropriations bill reinstating the thirty-five percent cap progressed through
Congress, Powell insisted that courts had left him little choice but to loosen
this regulation.
194
Only when the White House struck its eleventh-hour thirty-nine percent
deal, effectively rewriting the FCC's NTSO rule, did the Chairman stop
blaming the courts. The unrepentant ideological deregulator was back in
action, telling the Wall Street Journal on the day the compromise story
broke, "As a regulatory exercise, we did what we thought was best."195 Yet,
during the preceding six months, when Congress had attempted to roll back
the FCC's new media rules, the agency had been telling a different story-
that it had done what the courts thought was best.
This Section has sought to demonstrate that the remand remedy in Fox
had the following three consequences, broadly consistent with this Note's
game-theoretic analysis: (1) The FCC issued the forty-five percent rule,
which narrowly escaped legislative override under the protection of a
presidential veto; (2) Congress subsequently pursued the appropriations
process as its primary means of reversing the rule; and (3) the agency used
the judicial remand to deflect congressional criticism. One must
reemphasize that no single case study can serve as conclusive proof of an
abstract theory. This discussion is no exception, and it is best seen as an
190. Powell Response, supra note 188.
191. Ron Orol, Pols Lay Siege to Media Rules, DAILY DEAL, June 5, 2003, LEXIS, News &
Business, The Daily Deal (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Press Release, FCC, Press Statement of Chairman Michael Powell 1 (June 2, 2003),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A3.pdf.
193. See Jaret Seiberg, Tactical Strike, DAILY DEAL, June 9, 2003, LEXIS, News &
Business, The Daily Deal (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. See Dreazen & Flint, supra note 181.
195. Yochi J. Dreazen & Anne Marie Squeo, Reshaping Powell's Vision, WALL ST. J., Nov.
28, 2003, at A4.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004] 403
The Yale Law Journal
illustration of the Note's theoretical proposal. But the FCC's experience
does raise the optimistic possibility that-despite their many simplifying
assumptions-sequential models can contribute important insights about
our political institutions.
CONCLUSION
Public choice scholarship has recognized "that legislatures, executives,
and courts act within an interconnected system; and that it is impossible to
assess the actions of one constitutional actor without contemplating the
reactions of the others."'1 96 The bicameralism and presentment requirements
of Article I, Section 7 govern this lawmaking game between Congress and
the President. A decade ago, a simple sequential model demonstrated how
the emergence of the administrative state has biased the policy outcomes of
this process. Scholars have argued that the courts can change constitutional
law, statutory interpretation, and the Chevron doctrine to cure this bias.
This Note adds administrative law remedies to the list of possibilities. By
choosing to vacate arbitrary and capricious rules, courts could give
Congress opportunities to legislate with specificity, helping to preserve the
original design of Article I, Section 7. Unfortunately, courts have moved in
the opposite direction by increasingly remanding deficient agency rules
without vacatur. The sequential structure of bicameralism and presentment
offers reasons to reconsider this trend.
196. Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 2, at 566.
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